タグ: FortiGate

  • Transparent Firewall Validation: Obfuscating Target OS Information Against External Reconnaissance(FortiGate Validation)

    Transparent Firewall Validation: Obfuscating Target OS Information Against External Reconnaissance(FortiGate Validation)

    Transparent Firewall Validation: Obfuscating Target OS Information Against External Reconnaissance

    This technical validation is intentionally documented in English for the global engineering community and NIS2 compliance officers.


    Overview: Why “Hidden” OS Data is Your First Line of Defense

    The conclusion of this validation is clear: By inserting a Transparent Mode Firewall into an existing network, you can effectively obfuscate the Operating System (OS) information of target devices from external attackers.

    During the reconnaissance phase of a cyber attack, adversaries use tools like Nmap to identify OS versions and target specific vulnerabilities. Our real-world testing proves that a transparent-mode FortiGate acts as a “digital camouflage,” deceiving scanners and significantly reducing the accuracy of automated reconnaissance.

    The Strategic Value: Beyond Just “A Firewall”

    • OS Fingerprint Obfuscation: Forces scanners into “guess-mode,” preventing precise exploit targeting.
    • Zero Network Design Change: Achieve high-level security by simply “adding” a layer—no IP changes or routing re-designs required.
    • Evidence-Based Security: Moving beyond consultant-speak to prove protection via raw packet-level behavior.

    Technical Deep Dive: Disrupting the Nmap Fingerprinting Engine

    While AI summaries might simply state “OS not detected,” a professional analysis of the Raw Zenmap Logs reveals exactly how the FortiGate transparent engine protects the host. Below is the actual evidence from our validation lab.

    1. Evidence: Raw Nmap/Zenmap Signature Scan

    Note the “tcpwrapped” status and the “No exact OS matches” warning. This is the sound of an attacker’s reconnaissance failing in real-time.

    Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-03-25 15:20 +0900
    Nmap scan report for 192.168.100.100
    Host is up (0.0018s latency).
    Not shown: 993 closed tcp ports (reset)
    PORT     STATE SERVICE      VERSION
    135/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
    139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn    Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
    445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
    2000/tcp open  tcpwrapped
    5060/tcp open  tcpwrapped
    5357/tcp open  http           Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
    8008/tcp open  http
    
    Aggressive OS guesses: Microsoft Windows 11 21H2 (98%), Microsoft Windows 10 (94%)
    No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
    
    TCP/IP fingerprint:
    OS:SCAN(V=7.98%E=4%D=3/25%OT=135%CT=1%CU=37785%PV=Y%DS=1%DC=D%G=Y%M=FC6198%
    OS:TM=69C37F66%P=i686-pc-windows-windows)SEQ(SP=102%GCD=1%ISR=104%TI=I%TS=A
    OS:)OPS(O1=M5B4NW8ST11%O2=M5B4NW8ST11%O3=M5B4NW8NNT11%O4=M5B4NW8ST11)
    ...[Full Fingerprint Captured]...
    

    2. Analysis of the “tcpwrapped” Defense

    The appearance of “tcpwrapped” on ports 2000 and 5060 confirms that the FortiGate is intercepting the TCP three-way handshake. The firewall validates the connection but refuses to pass application-layer data to the scanner, effectively closing the door before the attacker can peek inside.

    3. Predictable Deployment (L1 Timer Consistency)

    The strategic advantage of this “surgical” insertion is its predictability. As documented in our Downtime Verification Report, the insertion downtime is strictly tied to the 10-second L1 Link-up timer. This makes it a low-risk, high-reward implementation for production environments.


    Strategic Implications for NIS2 Compliance in Finland

    For Finnish enterprises navigating NIS2 requirements, the ability to “add” robust reconnaissance protection without a multi-month network migration is a critical competitive edge. Large SIs often overlook these precision-based deployments in favor of massive infrastructure overhauls.

    Seeking a non-disruptive security audit or NIS2-compliant architecture?

    We specialize in “add-on” security that preserves business continuity while disrupting attacker reconnaissance.
    Contact for Deployment Validation


    Practical Notes

    • Testing was conducted in a controlled environment using FortiGate (Transparent Mode).
    • OS obfuscation results may vary depending on deep packet inspection (DPI) settings and target OS versions.
    • Real-world downtime was measured at 10.8 seconds, aligning with theoretical L1 recovery intervals.

    → Read our Philosophy: Why we prioritize non-disruptive design

  • Measured Downtime During Inline Insertion of a Transparent Firewall

    Measured Downtime During Inline Insertion of a Transparent Firewall

    Measured Downtime During Inline Insertion of a Transparent Firewall

    This test measures the interruption window observed during inline insertion of a transparent-mode firewall.


    Test Objective

    To evaluate the impact of physically inserting a transparent firewall into an active network path, focusing on real-world deployment conditions.


    Test Environment

    • Firewall: FortiGate (transparent mode)
    • Upstream device: Cisco CBS250-8T-D-JP (default settings)
    • Client: Windows PC
    • Topology: PC → FortiGate → Router → Internet

    The firewall was fully booted and operational before insertion.


    Test Method

    A continuous ICMP echo request was sent to a public endpoint.

    ping 8.8.8.8 -t | ForEach-Object { "{0:HH:mm:ss.fff} {1}" -f (Get-Date), $_ }
    

    During the test, the WAN-side cable of the firewall was removed and immediately reinserted, simulating a real inline deployment operation.

    The test was performed multiple times under identical conditions. The maximum observed interruption window was used for evaluation, to reflect a conservative estimate suitable for real-world deployment planning.


    Observed Result

    21:34:45.787 8.8.8.8 からの応答: バイト数 =32 時間 =3ms TTL=117
    21:34:50.571 要求がタイムアウトしました。
    21:34:55.575 要求がタイムアウトしました。
    21:34:56.585 8.8.8.8 からの応答: バイト数 =32 時間 =4ms TTL=117
    

    The last successful reply was recorded at 21:34:45.787, and successful replies resumed at 21:34:56.585.

    This indicates an observed interruption window of approximately 10.8 seconds.


    Interpretation: Alignment with Theoretical L1 Recovery

    The observed interruption window of 10.8 seconds is highly consistent with standard enterprise-grade network hardware behavior, rather than an arbitrary delay.

    Theoretical Basis: Most managed switches and firewalls utilize a 10-second L1 Keepalive/Link-up timer (often influenced by carrier delay settings) by default.

    Validation of Predictability: Our measurement of 10.8 seconds (the interval between the last successful ICMP reply and the first recovered reply) confirms that the downtime is strictly dictated by physical layer link-state detection.

    Engineering Conclusion: This result demonstrates that inserting a transparent-mode firewall does not trigger unpredictable software-level re-convergence or routing instability. The downtime is transparent, predictable, and scientifically grounded within standard L1 recovery intervals.


    Operational Considerations

    In real deployments, sufficient maintenance time must be secured in advance, as even short interruptions can impact active sessions and services.

    This measurement prioritizes worst-case behavior over average performance, to support safe deployment planning.


    Related Evidence

    View all validation results

  • Allowing VRRP, HSRP, and STP Through Transparent-Mode FortiGate

    Allowing VRRP, HSRP, and STP Through Transparent-Mode FortiGate

    Allowing VRRP, HSRP, and STP Through Transparent-Mode FortiGate

    This post records validation results for passing control traffic through a FortiGate deployed in transparent mode. The focus is on VRRP, HSRP, and STP/BPDU behavior.

    The purpose of this test is not to repeat vendor documentation, but to confirm actual behavior with real devices and real command outputs.


    Scope of Validation

    • VRRP forwarding
    • HSRP forwarding
    • STP/BPDU forwarding
    • Effect of set stpforward enable

    VRRP Verification (Cisco)

    Two Cisco routers were connected with a transparent-mode FortiGate inserted between them.

    Router#show vrrp brief
    Interface          Grp Pri Time  Own Pre State   Master addr     Group addr
    Gi0/5              1   100 3609       Y  Backup  192.168.84.2    192.168.84.254
    Router#

    The router remained in Backup state, confirming that the Master was detected.


    HSRP Verification (Cisco)

    Router#show standby brief
    Interface   Grp  Pri P State   Active          Standby         Virtual IP
    Gi0/5       1    100   Standby 192.168.84.1    local           192.168.84.254
    Router#

    The router remained in Standby state, confirming that the Active router was detected.


    VRRP Verification (NEC IX)

    Two NEC IX routers were connected with a transparent-mode FortiGate inserted between them. VRRP operated normally.


    STP/BPDU Behavior

    Layer 2 switches were tested with a transparent-mode FortiGate inserted between them.

    Topology

    • Cisco Catalyst 2960
    • Aruba 2530

    Result (via FortiGate)

    Switch#show spanning-tree | i root
    This bridge is the root
    
    HP-2530# show spanning-tree | i root
    This switch is root
    

    Both switches identified themselves as root, indicating that STP was not exchanged.


    Direct Connection Check

    When directly connected, STP operated normally.

    This confirms that FortiGate blocked BPDU in the default configuration.


    Configuration Change

    config system interface
    edit <interface-name>
    set stpforward enable
    next
    end

    After enabling this setting, STP communication became functional.


    Conclusion

    • VRRP passes through transparent FortiGate
    • HSRP passes through transparent FortiGate
    • STP is blocked by default
    • stpforward is required for BPDU forwarding

    If BPDU forwarding is not enabled, multiple root bridges may form, leading to unstable Layer 2 topology.


    This case is part of our Validation Evidence.

    View Validation Evidence